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ABSTRACT 9 
Microbes often form densely populated communities, which favor competitive 10 
and cooperative interactions. Cooperation among bacteria often occurs through 11 
the production of metabolically costly molecules produced by certain individuals 12 
that become available to other neighboring individuals, called public goods. This 13 
type of cooperation is susceptible to exploitation, since non-producers of a 14 
public good can benefit from it while saving the cost of its production (cheating), 15 
gaining a fitness advantage over producers (cooperators). Thus, in mixed 16 
cultures, cheaters can increase in frequency in the population, relative to 17 
cooperators. Sometimes, and as predicted by simple game-theoretic 18 
arguments, such increase in the frequency of cheaters causes loss of the 19 
cooperative traits by exhaustion of the public goods, eventually leading to a 20 
collapse of the entire population. In other cases, however, both cooperators and 21 
cheaters remain in coexistence. This raises the question of how cooperation is 22 
maintained in microbial populations. Several strategies to prevent cheating have 23 
been described involving a single trait and a unique environmental constraint. In 24 
this review, we describe current knowledge on the evolutionary stability of 25 
microbial cooperation, discussing recent discoveries describing the 26 
mechanisms operating in multiple traits and multiple constraints settings. We 27 
conclude with a consideration of the consequences of these complex 28 
interactions, and we briefly discuss the potential role of social interactions 29 
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involving multiple traits and multiple environmental constraints in the evolution 30 
of specialization and division of labor in microbes. 31 
INTRODUCTION 32 
Microbes often live in highly dense communities where interactions among 33 
individuals are both inevitable and essential (1). In uni-directional interactions 34 
between two individuals, the one which engages in an action can be defined as 35 
the ‘actor’ and the one influenced by the effects of the action as the ‘recipient’. If 36 
a social behavior influences positively the fitness of the recipient regardless of 37 
its fitness effect on the actor, it is considered a cooperative behavior (2, 3). 38 
Cooperation in microbes often involves the production of public goods by the 39 
actor (cooperator) which can benefit both the actor and the recipient. The nature 40 
of these public goods and the mechanisms by which they affect the fitness are 41 
diverse: materials to generate protective structures (e. g. exopolysaccharides to 42 
generate biofilms), toxins to kill competitors, enzymes to digest food, 43 
biosurfactants for group motility, proteins to detoxify the environment, molecules 44 
to scavenge nutrients, etc. (4, 5). 45 
Cooperation, however, can be vulnerable to exploitation, as individuals that are 46 
not contributing to the cooperative behavior (cheaters) by not producing public 47 
goods can benefit from them. Given that cheaters are not paying the cost but 48 
benefit from the cooperative behavior, they gain a relative fitness advantage 49 
over cooperators (2, 3). Thus, in mixed populations, cheaters can increase in 50 
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frequency, sometimes causing loss of cooperation and a decrease in population 51 
size. In other cases, however, there is maintenance of cooperation, even if 52 
there is a shift in the proportions of cooperators and cheaters in the population. 53 
The study of how cooperation is maintained in populations led to the 54 
identification of different mechanisms for protection against possible 55 
exploitations by cheaters (recently reviewed in 6). 56 
MECHANISMS TO PREVENT CHEATING ON SINGLE TRAITS 57 
Quorum sensing. Bacteria can produce, secrete and detect signaling 58 
molecules, called autoinducers, whose concentration in the medium increases 59 
as cells divide. When this concentration reaches a certain threshold, bacteria 60 
engage synchronously in a coordinated response. This process is called 61 
quorum sensing, since it enables bacteria to make coordinated ‘decisions’ 62 
depending on their ‘quorum’ (7, 8, 9). 63 
The expression of genes involved in the production of public goods is often 64 
controlled by quorum sensing (10, 11, 12, 13), which causes the public goods to 65 
be produced only when cooperative individuals are able to reach the quorum 66 
threshold. Thus, in this scenario, public goods production only occurs when 67 
cooperators are in greater numbers, precisely when cooperative behavior 68 
provides the greatest benefit: at high bacterial density, there is more efficient 69 
usage of public goods than at low bacterial density, where accessibility is lower 70 
(14). Therefore, via quorum sensing regulation, production of public goods is 71 
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restricted to the conditions where it is more productive for the producer cells, 72 
thus decreasing the chances for cheaters to outcompete cooperators and 73 
contributing to preventing the complete loss of the cooperative behavior (15) 74 
(Fig. 1A). 75 
Protection of cooperation mediated by traits regulated by quorum sensing has 76 
been both inferred theoretically (16, 17) and observed experimentally (18, 19, 77 
20, 21, 22). However, quorum sensing cheaters still arise. For example, it has 78 
been shown that mutants of Pseudomonas aeruginosa blind to the quorum-79 
sensing signal can avoid the cost of producing the public good regulated by 80 
quorum sensing (23, 24, 25). 81 
Bacteria, however, have mechanisms to avoid the spread of these types of 82 
mutants. An interesting example involves Bacillus subtilis (26). Like other 83 
bacterial species, wild populations of B. subtillis display a high degree of 84 
diversity in functional quorum-sensing alleles, called pherotypes. Each 85 
pherotype responds to an autoinducer similar to its own but not to autoinducers 86 
produced by other pherotypes. As such, a minority pherotype exploits the public 87 
goods produced by the majority of pherotypes (hence having the same fitness 88 
as obligatory cheaters) but resumes the production of the public good on its 89 
own when its density reaches a high value (26). Moreover, if cheaters take over 90 
a population by exploiting a public good regulated by quorum sensing, the 91 
decrease in the overall population density can go below the quorum threshold 92 
and that would cause the cooperators to seize the production of this public good 93 
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due to the quorum sensing regulation. In absence of the public good and with 94 
the cooperators saving the cost of its production, the fitness advantage of the 95 
cheaters would decrease and the population would stay in a polymorphic state. 96 
We recently provided experimental evidences of this; we showed that when 97 
cooperators are forced to produce constitutively the quorum sensing-regulated 98 
good (by adding exogenous quorum sensing signal), cheaters can invade the 99 
population to fixation, thereby causing full loss of cooperators and the 100 
subsequent loss of the public good trait (27). Thus, it can be said that the 101 
quorum sensing regulation of a public good trait can prevent the extinction of 102 
the cooperator phenotype in the population and preserve the genetic 103 
architecture of quorum sensing (21, 27). 104 
 105 
Partial privatization. In contrast to public goods, private goods are only 106 
accessible to producers, making cheating practically impossible. Privatization of 107 
public goods is well documented in yeast (28, 29, 30). Invertase is an 108 
extracellular enzyme produced by Saccharomyces cerevisiae that hydrolyzes 109 
sucrose into glucose and fructose, which then can be used by the entire 110 
population. Thus, the products of invertase activity mostly function as public 111 
goods. However, invertase producers have a certain degree of priority to access 112 
the monosaccharides generated by the invertase activity, preventing cheating 113 
on this trait (Fig. 1B). Although 99% of the monosaccharides are accessible to 114 
the entire population and therefore can be used by cheaters, the 1% of 115 
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privatized monosaccharides accessible only to cooperators is enough to avoid 116 
cheaters to outcompete them. Even though a mutant strain that does not 117 
produce invertase is able to invade a population of invertase producers, the 118 
latter are also able to increase in frequency if initially at very low frequencies. 119 
This leads to a steady state coexistence of invertase producers and cheaters 120 
(29). Interestingly, there is also density dependence fitness. The fitness of 121 
mutants is lower when the total population density is low because there are not 122 
enough cells producing invertase (31). In other words, some goods are public if 123 
population density is high, but can only be used privately if density is low. The 124 
dependence of the fitness of cheaters on population density seems to simply 125 
result from the fact that, at higher densities, cheaters are closer to producers of 126 
the public good. This was demonstrated through mathematical models and 127 
experimental data obtained from P. aeruginosa producing iron-scavenging 128 
siderophore molecules as public goods (32). Other systems for which it has 129 
been shown that the fitness of cheaters depends on total population density 130 
include: the production of siderophore molecule enterochelin by Escherichia coli 131 
(33), the production of adhesive exopolysaccharides (EPS) in B. subtilis biofilms 132 
(34) and the synthesis of the enzyme β-lactamase, which degrades β-lactam 133 
antibiotics such as ampicillin, by E. coli (35). In the latter example, non-134 
producers of β-lactamase may still survive in mixed populations at high cell 135 
density (when sensitive bacteria grow close to producers), showing that 136 
antibiotic resistance can also display positive density-dependence (35, 36, for a 137 
review about degradation and modification of antibiotics, see 37). These 138 
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examples, taken from very different systems, show that privatization of 139 
extracellular public goods is efficient at low, but not necessarily at high density. 140 
As a consequence, in these systems, usually neither producers nor cheaters 141 
reach fixation. 142 
Although perhaps not perfect, in nature one finds examples of paths towards 143 
privatization. A very interestingly example is the molecular structure of iron-144 
scavenging siderophores (38). Using data from 189 secreted siderophores 145 
(considering three different parameters for each enzyme) from 124 bacterial 146 
species, Kummerli et al. showed that their diffusivity inversely correlate with the 147 
structure level of the habitat they occupy. That is, highly diffusible siderophores 148 
are preferentially present in species living in structured habitats, such as soil 149 
and hosts, while poorly diffusible siderophores are mostly secreted by species 150 
from seawaters and other unstructured habitats. 151 
 152 
Policing. Policing can be defined as an action that influences negatively the 153 
fitness advantage of cheaters, by either limiting the benefit that cheaters obtain 154 
from the cooperative behavior or by increasing the advantage that it provides to 155 
cooperators (39) (Fig. 1C). Several examples of policing against cheaters have 156 
been repeatedly observed in many eukaryotes (40, 41, 42, 43) and in bacteria 157 
(44, 45, 46). For instance, in P. aeruginosa, the production of cyanide and the 158 
resistance against it are coupled traits, both regulated by the RhlIR system (47, 159 
48), which is in turn controlled by LasR (49, 11), the master regulator of quorum 160 
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sensing (50, 51, 52). LasR controls the production of many public goods, 161 
including elastase (50, 51), a secreted metalloprotease capable of digesting 162 
proteins, such as casein, into amino acids (53, 54). Therefore, in casein 163 
medium, lasR mutants can cheat (24). However, mutations in lasR cause the 164 
loss of cyanide production and, importantly, the resistance to it. Thus, LasR+ 165 
cells (cooperators) are immune to the cyanide they produce, whereas lasR 166 
mutants (cheaters) are not. In that scenario, the coupling of cyanide immunity 167 
with a public good production polices against cheater invasions, preventing the 168 
collapse of the population and therefore protecting cooperation (45). Inter-169 
species policing, involving reciprocity as a punishing/rewarding behavior, have 170 
been observed in polymicrobial communities (55) and in mutualistic 171 
relationships between certain bacteria and their hosts, such as Rhizobia-plants 172 
(56, 57) and Vibrio fischeri-squids (58, 59). 173 
 174 
Spatial structure. Spatial structures, such as biofilms, favor related cells to 175 
stay in close proximity and limit the diffusion of the public goods, increasing the 176 
benefit for producers and diminishing the chances for cheating (60, 61) (Fig. 177 
1D). Biofilms are one of the most common ways that bacteria generate spatial 178 
structure (62). Lipids, polysaccharides, and nucleic acid molecules secreted by 179 
bacteria function as an extracellular matrix (63) where the cells can anchor and 180 
switch from motile to static phase (62). The matrix limits the diffusion of the 181 
public goods secreted by cooperators (64, 65), making them to be less 182 
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accessible to cheaters, reducing their fitness advantage and therefore 183 
preventing cheating (66, 61, 64, 67). Interestingly, predictions based on 184 
computer simulations of multi-species biofilm formation showed that, when 185 
resources abound and therefore competitive effects are less severe, the 186 
production of public goods may be maintained in a focal species simply due to 187 
the mere presence of cells belonging to other species, which completely 188 
surround producers of the exoproduct. This results in the insulation of  189 
producers from non-producer cheater mutants of the same species, preventing 190 
intraspecific competition between the two social actors, therefore favouring 191 
within-species cooperation (68). Interestingly, biofilms often require the 192 
production of a costly exoproduct, namely EPS (adhesive exopolysaccharides), 193 
that can be a public good itself and, in thosee cases, is susceptible to 194 
exploitation (64). In other cases, however, similar but non-costly exoproducts 195 
involved in biofilms formation can be social but relatively nonexploitable (69). 196 
A particular effect of spatial segregation can occur, for instance, in a population 197 
divided in a set of subgroups composed by mixtures of cooperators and non-198 
cooperators in different proportions. If the cooperative behavior is costly, a 199 
decrease in the proportion of cooperators within each subgroup is expected. 200 
However, if the proportion of cooperators in each subgroups is sufficiently 201 
different, the overall proportion of cooperators in the whole population may 202 
increase. This is a statistical effect termed “Simpson’s paradox” after its 203 
discoverer, the statistician Edward H. Simpson (70). This effect was later shown 204 
by D. S. Wilson to be relevant for the problem of maintenance of cooperation 205 
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(71, 72). The reason for the increase in the proportion of cooperators in the 206 
overall population is that subgroups with more cooperators are also more 207 
productive, therefore resulting in higher cell yields. Interestingly, this effect is in 208 
fact a direct consequence of kin selection (selection of a  costly trait due to 209 
increased fitness of individuals genetically related to those possessing that 210 
trait), as both kin selection and group selection (selection at the level of group 211 
instead of at level of the individual) can be shown to be mathematically 212 
equivalent (73). If, from time to time, subpopulations join and then separate 213 
again, there should be a mechanism assuring a certain variance of cooperators 214 
among subgroups for the proportion of cooperators to continue increasing (71). 215 
This phenomenon was experimentally observed in microbial communities (74, 216 
75). Griffin et al. showed that if competition is local, the higher productivity of 217 
groups with more cooperators is (exactly) compensated by a stronger 218 
competition between kin individuals (74, 76, 77, 78, 2). Therefore, this effect is 219 
mostly observed if competition is global. 220 
 221 
Facultative cooperation. Another bacterial mechanism to overcome 222 
cheating is facultative cooperation, which can operate through metabolic 223 
prudence (79). P. aeruginosa can produce high levels of rhamnolipids (80), a 224 
carbon-rich surface polymer, which enables bacteria swarming to colonize new 225 
niches (81, 82). Xavier and colleagues showed that this bacterium only invests 226 
in rhamnolipid production under conditions of metabolic unbalance, i. e. when 227 
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carbon concentration is higher than nitrogen concentrations. Bacteria require 228 
both carbon and nitrogen to divide, whereas the production of rhamnolipids 229 
requires carbon but not nitrogen. Thus, by investing in rhamnolipid production 230 
only when the C/N ratio does not favor cell division, bacteria minimize the cost 231 
of this public good under conditions of strong competition, preventing 232 
cooperators to be outcompeted by non-producers (cheaters). Under nitrogen 233 
deprivation, the induction of rhamnolipid production allows bacteria to swarm 234 
away towards areas that might contain both nitrogen and carbon, where 235 
bacteria can start dividing again. Thus, facultative induction of cooperative 236 
behaviors reduces the chances of cheaters to invade bacterial populations of 237 
producers (79). Xavier et al. showed that, if production is constitutive, 238 
maintenance of cooperation would be possible only if producers of rhamnolipid 239 
were mostly surrounded by other producers of rhamnolipid, a very stringent 240 
situation. By facultatively producing rhamnolipid, however, producers strongly 241 
decrease the cost of its production, what allows the maintenance of cooperation 242 
even if producers and non-producers are mixed (83) (Fig. 1E). Another 243 
mechanism of facultative cooperation involves the production of a public good 244 
molecule (in this case, the siderophore pyoverdine in P. aeruginosa) during 245 
exponential phase, but not at stationary phase (84). Interestingly, production of 246 
this type of reusable public good molecules with long durability only when 247 
necessary is also a way of diminishing their production cost (85). 248 
 249 
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Antagonistic pleiotropy. Antagonistic pleiotropy can also contribute to 250 
stabilize cooperation (86). Indeed, some mutations that cause individuals to 251 
become cheaters (by ceasing to cooperate with other individuals), have 252 
pleiotropic effects and these mutants also become unable to perform a private 253 
behavior or to accomplish a fundamental metabolic step (87). Therefore, the 254 
pleiotropic effects of these mutations result in a direct fitness cost to these 255 
cheaters (Fig. 1F). Antagonistic pleiotropy has been observed in different 256 
systems, including instances in which cooperation is mediated by public goods. 257 
In these cases, the production of public and private goods is coupled (88). For 258 
instance, LasR regulates the production of various public and private goods in 259 
P. aeruginosa (10, 11, 12, 13). As mentioned before, one of the LasR-regulated 260 
public goods is elastase (50, 51). Thus, when casein is the sole carbon source, 261 
lasR mutants can behave as cheaters (24). However, lasR also controls the 262 
production of the enzyme necessary to digest adenosine (89, 90). In contrast to 263 
elastase, adenosine is maintained intracellularly, thus acting as a private good. 264 
When casein and adenosine are the only carbon sources available, cooperators 265 
(LasR+ cells) can use both while lasR mutants (cheaters) can only use the 266 
casamino acids generated by elastase activity, and not adenosine (90). The 267 
extra carbon source accessible to the cooperators provides them with an 268 
advantage over the cheaters, thus protecting the population against cheater 269 
expansion (88, 91). 270 
 271 
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Influence of phenotypic heterogeneity on cooperation. In certain 272 
cases, the different social roles involved in cooperation can be played by 273 
genotypically identical strains that differentiate phenotypically into functionally 274 
diverse social actors. Phenotypic differentiation in distinct cell types interacting 275 
cooperatively protects the population against invasion by cheaters for any of the 276 
functions exerted by the different cell types, since each cell type saves the costs 277 
of producing the public goods generated by the other cell types, and this 278 
reduces the competitive advantage of cheaters for either of the traits. This type 279 
of interactions has been observed in biofilms of Myxococcus xanthus, B. 280 
subtilis, and P. aeruginosa (92). A similar example of cooperation mediated by 281 
phenotypic heterogeneity was described in B. subtilis sliding motility, where the 282 
division of labor of two cell types (producers of either surfactin or extracellular 283 
matrix) allows a special structural organization that increases the rate of colony 284 
expansion, generating a strong ecological advantage and protecting the 285 
bacterial population against non-producers of either surfactin or matrix (93). 286 
There are also examples of cooperation mediated by phenotypic variation in 287 
host-pathogen interactions. For instance, the bistable expression of virulence 288 
determinants during infection of the mice gut by Samonella Typhimurium 289 
protects the bacterial population against the invasion by avirulent mutants, 290 
thereby promoting the evolutionary stability of virulence (94). 291 
COOPERATION AND CHEATING IN MULTIPLE TRAITS 292 
SCENARIOS 293 
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The mechanisms described above allow maintenance of cooperation and 294 
prevent cheating in uni-directional interactions, involving a single trait where the 295 
actors are either full cooperators or full cheaters for that trait. However, 296 
populations are often polymorphic and rely on more than one trait and, typically, 297 
diverse environmental constraints simultaneously affect social interactions 298 
among individuals. Thus, in natural settings, the most prevalent scenario is 299 
possibly that of multi-directional interactions under multiple environmental 300 
constraints. In these ‘multiple-traits / multiple-constraints’ settings, an individual 301 
can be “actor” for some traits and “recipient” for others, thus behaving 302 
simultaneously as a cooperator and as a cheater for different traits (95). Thus, 303 
in nature, interactions among different players can affect their social roles, 304 
leading to complex dynamics where the notions of “cooperation” and “cheating” 305 
are context dependent. An analogy to illustrate this concept could be a 306 
hypothetical study of a hunter/gatherer society by an anthropologist. In such 307 
populations, both hunting and gathering vegetables can be considered 308 
cooperative behaviors. Hunters are “actors” for meat obtention and “recipients” 309 
for vegetable collection, whereas gatherers are “actors” for vegetable obtention 310 
and “recipients” for meat acquisition. Thus the population, which requires both 311 
meat and vegetables, relies on this mutualistic interaction for its sustainment. If 312 
the anthropologist would study exclusively hunting as a cooperative trait, the 313 
consequence would be considering hunters as cooperators and gatherers as 314 
cheaters, since the latter do not hunt but eat the meat obtained by the hunters. 315 
And vice versa, if the anthropologist would focus only on gathering, the 316 
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consequence would be classifying hunters as cheaters, because they are not 317 
gathering but still benefit from it. To understand the social roles of both hunters 318 
and gatherers, the anthropologist would need to consider simultaneously the 319 
two players and the two traits involved. 320 
Similarly, in order to understand how cheating affects the dynamics of other 321 
biological systems involving multiple traits, the complex web of inter-species 322 
and inter-strain interactions must be addressed. There has been a growing 323 
literature focusing on the inter-strain and inter-species interactions in these 324 
communities. Brown and Taylor (95) established a theoretical framework for the 325 
evolution of joint social traits. They showed that, if two social traits interact, 326 
newly arising behavior not anticipated just by considering each trait alone, can 327 
occur. For example, policing mechanisms to refrain rivalry (within-groups 328 
competitions) (96) or excludability (through privatization) (97, 98) are mostly 329 
selected when relatedness is low. Relatedness is low when the probability that 330 
a cheater interacts with a cooperator is almost as high as the probability that a 331 
cooperator interacts with a cooperator. If a policing mechanism is effectively 332 
decreasing rivalry within groups of individuals, conditions may be favorable 333 
even when relatedness is low (95). 334 
 335 
Cross-feeding is a relationship wherein one genotype consumes products of 336 
another (unidirectional cross-feeding). However, in some cases, cross-feeding 337 
can also involve interactions where more than one trait is involved. This can 338 
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occur when the consumer genotype also produces a metabolite useful for the 339 
producer (bidirectional cross-feeding) (99). Therefore, bidirectional cross-340 
feeding is an example of multiple-traits / multiple-constraints interaction and, 341 
under certain circumstances, it can influence cooperation and diversity. For 342 
instance, a set of mathematical models, computer simulations and experiments 343 
involving either a community formed by genetically engineered Saccharomyces 344 
cerevisiae cooperating through metabolite-exchange or biofilms in which the 345 
methane-producing archaeon Methanococcus maripaludis cooperates with the 346 
bacterium Desulfovibrio vulgaris showed that, if the interaction between two 347 
species confers a strong benefit to both species, they intermix and there is 348 
cooperation between them. The intermix occurs by forming alternative layers. 349 
This pattern was confirmed using two different synthetic systems composed by 350 
two microbial species, but simulations predict the same intermixed pattern if 351 
several species strongly interact (100). Interestingly, with such spatial structure, 352 
there is maintenance of cooperation despite the appearance of cheater 353 
mutants. The reason is that, the less cheater cells contribute to the other 354 
partner, the more it were disfavored and eliminated (101). In another work, 355 
computer simulations showed that the stronger is the interdependence between 356 
interacting species, the higher is the number of mutualisms and community 357 
productivity. If, in contrast, interdependence is low, conflict takes over and 358 
interacting species tend to separate (102). 359 
In these cases of strong interdependence upon the settlement of mutual 360 
interchange of metabolites, one of the partners may lose biosynthetic functions, 361 
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thereby threatening cooperation. Waite and Shou used engineered S. 362 
cerevisiae to recreate such scenario and observed that an adaptive race of 363 
cooperators and cheaters may give the opportunity to cooperators to defeat 364 
cheaters (103). However, using a similar system in E. coli, D'Souza and Kost 365 
showed that the loss of metabolic functions is strongly selected for when the 366 
corresponding metabolites can be extracted from the environment (104, 105, 367 
106), in particular from cross-feeding among coexisting strains (104). Thus, the 368 
development of strong interdependences can destabilize cooperation in 369 
bidirectional cross-feeding scenarios. However, cooperation mediated by 370 
bidirectional cross-feeding can be protected through different mechanisms, as it 371 
is well illustrated in two recent papers. Germerodt et al. used a cellular 372 
automaton to simulate a structured habitat where there were interactions 373 
between six experimentally characterized genotypes. These genotypes differ in 374 
their ability and propensity to produce amino-acids. Upon varying several 375 
ecological parameters, the authors concluded that, in most parameters sets, 376 
obligate cross-feeders arise. Moreover, the presence of cross-feeders helped to 377 
stabilize genotypic diversity, while supplementing the system with required 378 
metabolites significantly reduced it (107). In a second recent study, experiments 379 
performed with two bacterial species, Acinetobacter baylyi and E. coli, able to 380 
exchange amino-acids showed that, in a liquid environment, non-cooperating 381 
strains were favored. However, in a structured environment, the authors 382 
observed that auxotrophs separate from cross-feeders, hence allowing for the 383 
stabilization of cooperative cross-feeding (108). 384 
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 385 
Recently, there has been an increasing number of studies addressing bacterial 386 
interactions in multiple-traits / multiple-constraints scenarios other than 387 
bidirectional cross feeding. Ross-Gillespie and colleagues (109) generated 388 
general predictions for different settings involving two traits, and tested these 389 
predictions by analyzing the evolutionary trajectories of production of two public 390 
goods genetically and functionally interlinked (the siderophores pyoverdine and 391 
pyochelin) by wild-type P. aeruginosa during experimental evolution under 392 
different levels of iron limitation (110, 111, 112). Under strong iron deprivation, 393 
both non-producers of pyoverdine and pyochelin can act as cheaters (74, 109). 394 
Because, under these conditions, pyoverdine-defective mutants have a larger 395 
relative fitness, a gradual decrease in pyoverdine production was observed, 396 
concomitant with an increase in pyochelin production. This indicates the 397 
appearance of pyoverdin non-producing cheaters. In contrast, although 398 
production of the two siderophores decreases over time under moderate iron 399 
limitation (where only pyochelin mutants are able to cheat), the drop is stronger 400 
in the case of pyochelin, revealing the rise of mutants on its production (109). 401 
Thus, the work by Ross-Gillespie et al. suggests that regulatory cross-link 402 
between two traits may help to stabilize cooperation as pyoverdine-defective 403 
cheaters become pyochelin-producing cooperators, which reduces their relative 404 
advantage (Fig. 2A). 405 
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Inglis and colleagues (113) used mathematical models and experimental 406 
communities of P. aeruginosa to demonstrate that the presence of a loner strain 407 
(non-producing the main public good but producing a functionally linked one 408 
which is less efficient) can lead to rock-paper-scissor dynamics in which 409 
cooperators outcompete loners, cheaters outcompete cooperators and loners 410 
outcompete cheaters (Fig. 2B). In this scenario, the presence of the loner 411 
protects cooperation in environments that would otherwise favor cheating and 412 
reduction in diversity, such as well-mixed communities (113). 413 
Recently, Popat and colleagues (114) explored the interaction between two 414 
traits not linked at the regulatory level but connected functionally: production of 415 
the quorum sensing molecule Pseudomonas Quinolone Signal (PQS) (115) and 416 
production of siderophores in P. aeruginosa. PQS is a powerful iron chelator 417 
that can act as an iron trap (116), decreasing iron availability and therefore 418 
increasing the relative fitness of siderophore-defective cheaters. Thus, Popat et 419 
al. showed that production of one social trait may indirectly affect the costs and 420 
benefits of another social trait, influencing the social behavior of cheaters for the 421 
latter (Fig. 2C). The authors speculate that similar mechanisms might have the 422 
potential to contribute to preserving cooperation (114). 423 
Using a novel tri-partite co-culture system involving three social actors (wild-424 
type P. aeruginosa as full cooperator, and lasR and pvdS mutants, unable to 425 
produce elastase and the siderophore pyoverdine, respectively, as 426 
cheaters/partial cooperators) in single- or double-constraint environments 427 
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(presence of casein as sole carbon source and/or iron limitation), we studied the 428 
consequences of the interactions between two regulatorily and functionally 429 
independent social traits (27). When the two constraints are imposed (presence 430 
of casein as sole carbon source and iron limitation), the lasR mutant is a 431 
cheater for elastase but a cooperator for pyoverdine, whereas the pvdS mutant 432 
cooperates for elastase production and is a cheater for pyoverdine production. 433 
We observed that, under these conditions, the advantage of the pvdS mutant 434 
for not producing pyoverdine is higher than that of lasR for not producing 435 
elastase. As a consequence of the different costs associated with the different 436 
traits, in 3-way competitions, pvdS causes the cessation of the cheating 437 
advantage by lasR mutants and dominates the population. This domination of 438 
pvdS prevents the drastic population collapse otherwise caused by the invasion 439 
of lasR mutants, which occurs if pvdS is not present or in a single-constraint 440 
(casein as a sole carbon source) environment. Thus, this two-traits / two-441 
constraints system allowed us to unveil the existence of strong context 442 
dependent ecological interactions between cheaters for orthogonal (i. e. 443 
independent) social traits, which can induce or prevent a drastic collapse in 444 
population fitness (helping to stabilize/destabilize cooperation) (Fig. 2D). We 445 
also developed a mathematical model to determine the universal factors 446 
governing these social interactions. The model showed that social dynamics in 447 
multiple-traits / multiple-constraints systems are determined mainly by the 448 
differences between the costs of the social traits involved, whereas their 449 
benefits only affect population yields. Therefore, the degree of the population 450 
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collapse induced upon cheaters invasion depends on the benefit provided by 451 
the most costly trait. This work highlights the importance of the relative costs 452 
and benefits of the different cooperative traits in predicting the outcome for 453 
populations in complex environments where multiple traits are required (27). 454 
 455 
CHEATING ON CHEATERS: A STEP TOWARDS THE DIVISION 456 
OF LABOR? 457 
Cooperative interactions in multiple-traits / multiple-constraints scenarios tend to 458 
generate polymorphism and potentially lead to the evolution of functional 459 
dependency, as formulated in the Black Queen Hypothesis (117, 118). 460 
Moreover, the simultaneous role of different social actors as cooperators and 461 
cheaters, which generate the establishment of these inter-dependent 462 
interactions, could be considered as a germinal stage in the path towards 463 
functional specialization (119). Thus, social interactions in multiple-traits / 464 
multiple-constraints microbial communities can function as an intermediate 465 
phase towards the division of labor (120, 121, 122). Interestingly, 466 
Hammerschmidt et al. showed that, in spatially structured microcosms inhabited 467 
by “wrinkly spreader” cooperators and “smooth” cheaters of Pseudomonas 468 
fluorescens, the latter can function as a germ line that facilitates the 469 
reproduction of bacterial populations as collectives (123), describing a 470 
mechanism for the role of cheaters in the evolution of multicellularity. 471 
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However, Oliveira and colleagues (124) proposed the existence of certain 472 
limitations for cooperation for multiple traits. Through mathematical modeling, 473 
they inferred that this type of cooperation evolves under conditions of 474 
intermediate genetic mixing. They inferred that the evolution of inter-dependent 475 
cooperative exchanges of multiple public goods reduces the overall productivity 476 
of the community with respect to genotypes able to produce all the public goods 477 
autonomously (124). Thus, there seem to be constraints to the evolution of 478 
inter-dependent cooperation for multiple traits in bacterial communities. 479 
Interestingly, this model does not consider situations where production of public 480 
goods vary in the cost and benefits and, as discussed above, these factors can 481 
change dramatically the outcome of social interactions involving multiple traits 482 
(27). Additional experimental and theoretical research will help to clarify the 483 
extension and limits of social interactions involving multiple traits and multiple 484 
constraints in microbial communities.  485 
The exploration of these thrilling research avenues will significantly contribute to 486 
revealing the complex eco-evolutionary implications of social relationships in the 487 
bacterial world. However, the information obtained from the study of these 488 
interactions can be considered in a broader perspective. For instance, certain 489 
theories in economics, such as ”comparative advantage”, which describes how 490 
individuals, companies, or countries can save time and energy by specializing in 491 
the production of one trait while obtaining others by exchanging with different 492 
partners (125), are currently being tested in microbial systems (126, 127). Thus, 493 
sociomicrobiology not only might help to address biomedical threats (128) but, 494 
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through these interdisciplinary approaches, might also contribute to further 495 
understand socioeconomic challenges. 496 
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 530 
FIGURE LEGENDS 531 
Figure 1. Mechanisms that prevent cheater invasions in single-trait 532 
scenarios. 533 
A. Quorum sensing. Bacteria minimize the exploitation by cheaters via 534 
collectively producing public goods only when cells reach a given cell density 535 
(quorum), which is determined by sensing the concentration of signaling 536 
molecules B. Partial privatization. Producers of a given public good having 537 
prioritized access (represented by thicker green arrows) to it can prevent 538 
exploitation by cheaters. C. I. Policing via direct harm. By coupling production 539 
of a public good with production of a deleterious factor and its corresponding 540 
resistance system, cooperators harm cheaters while being immune. C. II. 541 
Policing via reciprocity. If, in a mutualistic public good exchange relationship, 542 
one of the actors stops their production, the other party can downregulate their 543 
own production to reciprocate the non-producer. D. Facultative cooperation. 544 
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In the case of metabolic prudence, bacteria produce a public good only when 545 
the cell division is not possible; the public good can alter the environment or 546 
allow bacteria to move to a new environment where growth is possible, and 547 
then the public good production stops and bacteria start dividing. E. Spatial 548 
structure. When sister cells can stick together, producer cells share the public 549 
good mostly among other producers, minimizing the exploitation by cheaters. F. 550 
Antagonistic pleiotropy. By coupling production of a public and a private 551 
good, cooperators can access both, whereas the cheaters can only have 552 
access to the public good. This process diminishes the relative advantage of the 553 
cheaters and minimizes exploitation by cheaters. 554 
Figure 2. Cheating and cooperation in multiple traits scenarios 555 
A. Interlinked public good traits. Regulatory and functional linkage of public 556 
good production affects the course of adaptation depending on the 557 
environment. Expression of pyoverdine and pyochelin differ in high and 558 
moderate iron limitation environments (I); uni-directional inhibition of pyochelin 559 
by pyoverdine (II) affects the evolution of these traits under different iron 560 
limitation (III) (109) (the direction of the arrows in (III) indicate the changes in 561 
siderophore production during propagations of cultures along the experimental 562 
evolution). B. Rock-paper-scissors. Cheaters can outcompete cooperators, 563 
loners can outcompete cheaters, and cooperators can outcompete loners. In 564 
triple mixtures, loners reduce the relative advantage of cheaters and thus allow 565 
the maintenance of cooperation (113). C. Effects of one public good trait on 566 
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another via environmental modification. Changes in the environment caused 567 
by a public good trait can affect the production of another, unrelated public 568 
good, and eventually affecting the relative fitness of its cheaters (114). D. 569 
Cheating on cheaters. A drastic decrease in the population size due to the 570 
invasion of a cheater (elastase-deficient P. aeruginosa) occurs in mixed 571 
populations in the following scenarios: (I) in environments where only that public 572 
good (elastase) is necessary for growth; (II) when a mutant of a second public 573 
good trait (pyoverdine-deficient P. aeruginosa) is introduced but only the first 574 
public good (elastase) is produced; (III) when both public goods (elastase and 575 
pyoverdine) are necessary but the population lacks the mutant of the second 576 
public good. Invasion of the first cheater and the drastic population collapse due 577 
to its invasion is only avoided in the following scenario: (IV) when the both 578 
public goods are necessary and both cheaters are present, the cheater that 579 
avoids producing the most costly public good (pyoverdine-deficient P. 580 
aeruginosa) outcompetes the other (elastase-deficient P. aeruginosa) (27).  581 
The thicknesses of the arrows indicate relative differences in cost (orange 582 
arrows) and benefits (green arrows). Symbols that are the same as in Figure 1 583 
are described in the legend of Figure 1 to avoid repetition. 584 
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